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KMT: A Trompe-l’œil Victory
The December 2004 Taiwanese Legislative Elections
Frank Muyard
1 The official results of the December 11th 2004 Legislative Yuan (Parliament) elections
in  Taiwan  gave  a  clear  majority  to  the  Pan-Blue  camp,  made  up  of  the  Chinese
Nationalist Party or Kuomintang (KMT), the People First Party (Qinmindang, PFP) and
the New Party (Xindang, NP). This was to many a surprise as expectations of a Pan-
Green  victory  following  the  re-election  of  President  Chen  Shui-bian  in  March  and
numerous opinion polls led pundits to predict a shift of control of Parliament to the
greens1. For more seasoned specialists of Taiwan politics such a feat was seen however
to be rather difficult to achieve2. The discrepancy between the opinion polls and the
final  result  created  a  sense  of  shock  and  a  resounding  defeat  for  the  Democratic
Progressive Party (Minjindang, DPP) and the TSU (Taiwan Solidarity Union, Tailian),
the two parties forming the Pan-Green camp. In the domestic and international media,
as well  as in Peking,  some were quick to read into these results  a  rejection by the
Taiwan electorate of Chen Shui-bian’s Taiwan-centred policies and independence goals
as well as a shift in favour of a political rapprochement with China3. 
2 Although the election’s outcome clearly represents a failure for Chen and the DPP, a
closer analysis of the results shows that, compared to the 2001 legislative election, not
only both camps include winners and losers but also that the DPP is the only party to
see an actual rise in the number of votes received. The Pan-Blue victory is, then, more
about merely holding onto a majority than getting a strong new mandate from the
voters.  The Blue camp’s one seat loss,  the redistribution of votes between its  three
components as well  as a very low turnout all  indicate that it  can hardly claim any
progress in political dominance. On the other hand, the persistence of the opposition’s
grasp  on  the  legislature  is  a  huge  setback  for  Chen’s  second-term  plans  and  will
certainly  trigger  a  repositioning  and  shift  in  Taiwan’s party  strategies  with  future
elections in view.
3 This  article  will  first  look  back  at  the  result  and  the  reasons  behind the  Pan-Blue
victory,  then  present  a  more  detailed  reading  of  the  poll’s  figures  that  leads  to  a
reconsideration  of  some  of  the  first  interpretations  of  the  election  results.  It  will
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conclude  on  the  poll’s  short-term  consequences  that  are  already  reshaping  the
country’s political dynamics.
The Pan-Blue victory
4 The last opinion poll run by the all-news channel TVBS, gave, on the basis of a 70%
turnout, a slight victory to the Pan-Green camp with 106 seats against 105 to the Pan-
Blues, the independent candidates holding the balance and the key to the legislature
majority4. Such a poll already hinted that the proclaimed majority victory by the ruling
party  and  its  smaller  partner  would  not  be  so  easy,  especially  when  the  pro-Blue
inclinations  of  most  of  the  independents  were  taken  into  account.  Indeed,  the
December  11th  election  for  the  Sixth  Legislature  sent  back  almost  the  exact  same
Parliament as in 2001 (Table 1)5. Pan-Blue won 114 seats, losing one seat, but keeping its
majority, while Pan-Green only got 101 seats and the independents 10 for a total 225
seats. The slight increase (+1) by Pan-Green shows the persistence of its progress in
legislative elections since 1998, but falls short of its own predictions (between 105 and
120  seats)  and  above  all  of  the  113  seats  landmark  that  assures  control  of  the
legislature.
 
1. Legislative elections results (by seats)
5 Within the Blue camp, the election witnessed a reversal of the 2001 legislative election
result where the PFP made big gains at the expense of the KMT, which fell then to its
lowest ever level. This time the KMT raised its number of seats by 11 to 79 while the
PFP lost 12 of its former 46 legislators for a final 34 seats. The New Party won one seat
(Kinmen) in 2001 and kept it in 2004. Three more NP members were actually elected
this time although they are counted within the KMT tally because, except for Kinmen,
NP candidates officially ran under the KMT banner in order to maximise the number of
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complementary legislators attributed proportionally to each party’s overall  share of
the vote 6. 
6 Still the DPP kept its position as the nation’s biggest party with 89 seats, two extra
seats. For the green camp, this result was overshadowed by the loss of one seat by the
TSU, which takes it down to 12 legislators, and above all by its continuing minority
status in the legislature.
7 The percentages received by each party reveal similar trends although with interesting
differences:  the DPP garnered 35.7% of the votes,  a 2.3% growth compared to 2001,
which makes it the biggest gainer in this election. The KMT received 32.8% of the votes,
apparently  a  big  jump from 2001  (28.6%).  But  when the  NP figures  are  added,  the
combined  KMT-NP  2004  and  2001  tallies  are  32.9%  and  31.1%,  showing  an  actual
progress of 1.8%, lower than the DPP. For the PFP, the fall is heavy: minus 4.7% on 2001
for a total of only 13.9%, while the TSU saw a repeat of its 2001 score with 7.8% of the
votes (+0.03%).  The rest went to the independents who received roughly 0.5% more
votes than in 2001F0BE9.6% (Table 2).
8 This election thus marked a major victory for the KMT, which for the first time since
1998 progressed in a national election. For the PFP it was a very disappointing result,
while  bickering  and  complaining  by  PFP  leaders  against  its  bigger  and  “bullying”
brother started even before election day as its candidates sensed defeat coming. The
KMT advances appear indeed to result directly from a shift in the votes and influence
back from the PFP: +11 seats for the KMT and –12 for the PFP (+8 and –8 respectively
when only directly elected candidates are counted). The outcome constitutes thus a
zero-sum game for the opposition, but certainly not for the KMT, which engineered an
impressive  reversal  on  2001.  Feelings  and  expressions  of  victory  were  therefore
especially strong at the KMT and to a lesser extent at the NP7. 
9 Most of the KMT and media post-election hype about the opposition’s success must be
seriously balanced with the real extent of the Pan-Blue achievement. The KMT success
would not have been considered so great  if  the party and Lien Chan had not been
considered finished after their defeat in the presidential election last March. It is thus a
timely  remainder  of  the  continuing  weight  of  the  KMT  and  its  moderate  Chinese
nationalist orientation in Taiwan’s political field. 
10 Inadvertently, the DPP through its perception of itself as the new representative of the
national  majority  and  of  2004  as  the  start  of  an  era  of  genuine  green  power  and
unstoppable momentum for Taiwan’s self-affirmation also gave its opponent’s victory a
stronger impact that would have normally been the case with such a repeat of the 2001
results. To its defence, the pitiful shape of the Blue camp after their failure to regain
the presidency, the aggressive street reactions by PFP legislators and supporters in its
wake, the refusal of the two Pan-Blue candidates to officially recognise their defeat and
their  persistence  in  appealing  unsuccessful  lawsuits  against  Chen’s  re-election—all
behaviour badly perceived by the large majority of  the population as  opinion polls
attested repeatedly throughout the year—, the KMT’s  inner dissent,  and finally  the
incapacity  of  the  two  parties  to  finalise  their  highly publicised  merger  were  also
convincing  factors  for  the  green  camp  and  part  of  the  media  to  bet  on  the
disintegration of the blue forces8.  Moreover the DPP and Chen Shui-bian knew they
would have  to  prevail  in  the  legislative  election to  have any hope of  breaking the
institutional stalemate that characterised the relation between the government and the
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legislature in the last four years and push forward their policies. The pressing desire to
achieve that goal might then have been confused with the capacity to deliver it.
Main factors of the opposition victory
11 With the wind of popular support apparently blowing in their direction, the Pan-Green
certainly fell into the overconfidence trap. However elections are won on the ground
and DPP’s defeat can more directly be attributed to certain choices and errors made in
dealing with four main factors of this election: its local nature, the type of strategy and
campaign  favoured  by  the  parties,  the  tactics  of  candidate  nomination  and  vote-
allocation, and finally the very low turnout.
The nature of the election 
12 Legislative  elections,  particularly  in  Taiwan—but  that  would  be  true  for  most
democracies—,  are  largely  dominated  by  local  questions  and  are  therefore  very
different  from  the  national-type  presidential  elections  where  the  electorate  must
choose the leader who will represent the country and its general political orientation
for the next four years from among a few individuals. Consequently, the parties that
will best grasp the needs and desire of their local constituents, district by district, are
the ones likely  to  emerge as  winners.  In  Taiwan,  classic  patron-client  relationships
have long taken the form of deep-rooted and publicly recognised local factions or local
networks of influence that tend to have a huge effect on local and legislative elections
in terms of vote allocation and group-voting9. Although the dominance of local factions
have been reportedly on the wane, recent surveys of electoral campaigns in the centre
and the south show that success of local politicians is still  very dependent on their
associations with one kind or another—preferably several—of network or faction10. This
system has  been recognised as  constituting  the  basis  of  the  KMT’s  local  power  for
decades and the Nationalist Party, even less wealthy than before, is still at its best when
using these political and client-based local organisations to its advantage11.
13 This has two consequences. First, the subsequent decision by other parties to play the
game of local organisations rather than insist on mere party affiliation and loyalty. For
the TSU, born out of the KMT’s “localisation” faction, this goes as natural practice and,
in fact, most of its work in the last three years has been to try to transfer the KMT’s
local networks support to itself, especially in the south although with limited success.
The same goes for the PFP. For the DPP, the stakes are different as a significant part of
its programme and image is built on the rejection of local factions and network power-
systems criticised as vote-buying machines of a corrupt KMT, and from which it was
traditionally excluded12. 
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2. Legislative elections reusults (by votes and in %)
14 Reports and first evidence from the election results indicate however that this time the
DPP  engaged  itself  into  much  closer  co-operation  with  local  vote-gathering
organisations than in 2001, in the south as in the north, leading some observers and
DPP strategists to deplore a backward trend away from modern party politics and an
increased  dependency  upon  corporatist  and  local  demands  that  can  easily  lead  to
corruption13.  Actually,  the  current  polling  system  and  historical  strength  of  local
networks in Taiwan make it impossible for the DPP to ignore local faction power and
leverage in elections14. In the end, the green camp was however clearly not as efficient
as  the  KMT  and  the  independents  in  mobilising  local  networks  to  support  its
candidates.
Blue and green camp campaigns
15 A striking characteristic of the December 2004 election is the opposite approaches to
the poll and campaigning favoured by the two camps: an ideology-oriented, identity-
focused, national party and Chen-centred campaign for the DPP and the TSU, while the
blue camp chose to privilege a more pragmatic and locally based campaign focused on
constituents’ needs and network mobilisation.
16 At first, the DPP campaign was actually much less ideological and mixed the promotion
of government achievements with promises to do better with a majority victory. The
reasons of the shift and the direct intervention of Chen in the day-to-day campaigning
are  two-fold:  the  lack  of  response  of  the  population  to  DPP’s  electioneering up  to
October  and  the  fear  of  voter-poaching  into  the  DPP’s  pro-independence  core
electorate by a very vocal and active TSU. From November on, the DPP and Chen Shui-
bian ran a near repeat of the March 2004 presidential election campaign15, centred on
pro-independence  and  identity  issues,  and  personalised,  on  Chen  himself—an
overwhelming presence outshining the four DPP “kings” originally in charge of the
campaign16.  It  led  to  an outpouring of  pro-Taiwan and anti-China propositions  and
measures by Chen, the government, and Pan-Green supporters symbolically handing
the control of most of the DPP’s campaign agenda to the TSU and Lee Teng-hui’s ideas17.
17 Pan-Green  main  issues  were  as  follows:  the  strengthening  of  Taiwanese  national
identity, upholding national pride—being Taiwanese—, reinforce the nation’s military
and political strengths against China (notably through the Parliament’s ratification of a
big  US  arms-package  deal),  pursue  the  ongoing  school-curriculum  and  textbook
reforms towards a Taiwan-centred ideology, get rid of the last remnants of KMT party-
state heritage and influence in the administration and the political field, and last but
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not  least  the  rewriting  of  the  “Chinese”  Constitution  into  a  real  “Taiwanese”
Constitution  adopted  through  a  referendum  (but  still—for  the  DPP—keeping  the
“Republic of China” [ROC], the ROC’s name, emblems and official territory). 
 
3. Number of local electoral district candidates and success ratio (elected candidates/candidates)
18 Some  of  these  proposals  are  still  controversial  in  Taiwan  and  many  people,  even
without necessarily being opposed to them in theory, did not feel strongly about the
timing of their introduction in the political debate and the need to support them in
practice. Inevitably these proposals also led to more provocative calls from the green
ranks—ike  the  rejection  of  Sun  Yat-sen  as  the  father  of  the  nation  or  a  shift  in
administrative exam subjects to only Taiwanese topics—which had then to be officially
dismissed by Chen or the government18. Added to the aggressive attacks by Chen on the
KMT for its “soft” coup d’état tentative in the wake of its March re-election, and his
official  call  for  “name-rectification”  (zhengming)  of  the  country’s  representative
offices abroad, governmental institutions and state-owned enterprises from “China” to
“Taiwan”, they generated a strongly polarised electoral debate where conflicts between
competing ideologies and nationalisms prevailed over any possibility of compromise or
middle-way policies.
19 Although DPP leaders and strategists officially defended this new abrasive tone and the
take-over by Chen of the day-to-day campaign, more than a few candidates were clearly
uncomfortable with it and did not feel very good about its eventual chance of success.
Observers  alike  felt  that  the  strongly  ideological  rhetoric  would  prove  to  be
counterproductive19. Successful or not, its final outcome would then clearly be Chen’s
personal responsibility.
20 In the blue camp, national support was provided to all candidates with big meetings,
local  visits  by  party  leaders,  and  a  flurry  of  TV  advertisements.  But  the  Pan-Blue
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parties’ campaign was still essentially locally based, constituency-centred and run by
individual  candidates  and  local  party  chapters.  In  the  centre  and  the  south,  the
avoidance of any party affiliation went even to the extent of discarding all references to
and emblems of the KMT, Lien Chan or the PFP on candidates’ election materials, these
partisan  associations  being  seen  as  detrimental  to  the  local  candidates’  electoral
prospects.  The  Pan-Blue  campaign  however  was  not  devoid  of  any  political  and
ideological issues. They mainly turned around the conservative and responsible image
the KMT has always been keen to develop: maintenance of Taiwan’s Chinese identity
and ROC history;  avoidance of  any provocation and risk  of  war through increasing
“Taiwanisation”;  outward  rejection  of  desinicisation;  thawing  of  Taiwan’s  political
relationship with Peking; reducing the cost of the US arms-package deal considered too
expensive for the national budget and militarily unnecessary if cross-Strait relations
improve; boosting of Taiwan’s economy through business-oriented measures and closer
cross-Strait economic integration. 
21 But as the highly controversial creation of a “March 19th special Truth investigation
committee” by the opposition-controlled Parliament attests,  the Pan-Blue’s  rhetoric
against the ruling party and Chen was as aggressive as its opponents’. In the last weeks
of campaigning, political tension increased further when the KMT first requested the
hand-over by the DPP of governmental powers to the blue camp in case of the latter’s
legislative victory on the basis of political legitimacy and “spirit” of the Constitution,
and then threatened to wage chaos in the new legislature if it did not win the polls20.
This radicalisation in discourse and tactics by the Nationalist Party surprised many. It
was also difficult to understand how continuity in Pan-Blue legislative control could be
translated in Constitutional and institutional changes and re-attribution of executive
power on the basis of a “new” opposition legitimacy although this was not something
implemented on similar past occasions, such as the 2001 legislative election. Whether
the  Taiwanese  constitutional  system  can  be  compared  to  the  French  and  its
“cohabitation”,  or  the US one and its  clear division between the three branches of
power has yet to be determined as it is clearly a system that takes from both models21.
In the meantime, any sort of compromise between the ruling and opposition parties, if
any, might more likely take the form of governmental coalitions or case-by-case co-
operation in Parliament than a full take-over of the executive responsibilities by the
legislative majority.
22 As noticed before the poll, the DPP’s campaign strategy totally ran against its previous
experience of success in legislative and local elections22. Its eventual failure reinforces
the idea that the choice of a presidential-style campaign based on controversial and
ideological identity issues was ill-suited to the nature of the election and, therefore
constituted  one  of  the  main  strategic  reasons  of  the  Pan-Green  defeat.  But  other
factors, essentially tactical, can be seen behind the election result.
Candidates’ numbers and vote-allocation
23 On the tactics  side,  the peculiarity  of  Taiwan’s  single  non-transferable  vote (SNTV)
legislative poll system—in multi-member constituencies—requires the maintenance of
a very elaborate organisation by the parties on the local level in order to maximise the
number  of  candidates  elected  within  their  estimate  vote-pool.  First  the  number  of
party candidates must be limited to avoid dispersion of the vote between too many
candidates  resulting  in  the  loss  of  all  or  most  of  them.  Secondly,  a  vote-allocation
system has to be implemented to ensure that each candidate receives the minimum
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expected amount of votes needed for his election. As some candidates (incumbents,
local or TV celebrities, party stars) are better known than others, and some are closely
related  to  local  networks  that  can  deliver  big  number  of  votes,  good  co-operation
between the candidates of a same party or alliance of parties and an efficient electoral
organisation are needed to control the transfer of votes to candidates with lesser initial
chances of success. Any failure in one of these steps can result in the loss of seats on
poll’s day. 
24 Particularly  difficult  for  the  parties  is  to  assure  co-operation  between  their  own
candidates who are, by virtue of the polling system, competitors for the same share of
the vote. Another challenge is to measure and regulate any shift of votes within one
party’s  own  electorate  to  avoid  spontaneous  and  panic-mode  “save-the-weak-
candidates”  movements  that  can  be  go  beyond  the  amount  of  votes  needed  and
eventually be lethal  to “strong” candidates suddenly deprived of  too much of  their
original support.
25 The vote-allocation system and limited number of candidates have traditionally been
seen as a DPP strength and explain why it so often has a larger share of legislator seats
than its share of votes. This was notably the case in the 2001 legislative election, while
the blue camp,  and especially  the  KMT,  was  then criticised for  its  high number of
candidates and poor handling of vote allocation.
 
4. Legislative elections overall votes and turnout
26 This time, the three opposition parties co-operated pretty well in limiting the number
of their candidates. KMT and NP candidates for local electoral districts numbered only
75 (74 + 1) in December 2004 against 129 (97 + 32) in 2001 while PFP candidates went
down to 41 from 61 (Table 3)23. The reduction is significant (-54 candidates) with a Pan-
Blue total  of  116 candidates (against  170).  It  reflects  a  much better appreciation of
actual electoral prospects by the three parties and resulted in the end in a successful
outcome.  In  terms  of  vote-allocation,  however,  co-operation  was  difficult  and
generated  numerous  complaints  by  PFP  and  NP  candidates  and  leaders  about  the
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“ungenerous”and  “unfair”  behaviour  of  the  KMT,  which  was  seen  as  the  biggest
potential purveyor of votes24.
27 On the green side,  the number of  candidates for electoral  districts  remained stable
(122) with the DPP adding nine candidates for a total of 92 and the TSU cutting nine
candidates to 30. Although the “too” high level of DPP candidates was criticised after
the poll, as we see, the overall number of green candidates did not change. Besides, as
Bruce Jacobs pointed out, the DPP had to nominate more candidates if it wanted to
achieve majority control of the legislature25. The problem seems then to reside more in
the  number  of  TSU  candidates.  The  TSU  has  indeed  the  lowest  ratio  of  elected
legislators/candidates  of  the  four  main  parties  (23.3%),  expressing  obvious  over-
confidence by the TSU in its goal of doubling its legislators on a narrow Taiwan identity
platform.  The DPP ratio  of  success  (76.1%)  is  rather  good and close  to  the KMT.  A
dysfunctional vote-allocation system between the DPP candidates themselves, as shown
by the high number of DPP incumbents who were not re-elected, was also a direct cause
of lost seats. Poor co-operation and allocation of votes within and between the DDP and
the TSU must therefore more appropriately be considered the culprits in the green
camp’s failure to achieve a better result.
28 Indeed, the high toll of incumbent casualties was impressive: 37 altogether, including
14 DPP, nine PFP and four TSU for only four KMT (the others six were independents).
Well-known  political  characters  and  party  officials  were  among  the  victims26.  The
renewal  of  Parliament  therefore  has  many new and some inexperienced legislators
especially in the DPP caucus27. This would tend to prove that the parties’ control over
their vote-catching system was defective. But it is not true everywhere, even for the
DPP who had 100% success in several electoral districts28.
External factors
29 Like during the presidential election last March, Peking did its best not to be seen as
interfering in the election while, this time, maintaining a string of vocal criticisms and
rebuttals  of  Chen  Shui-bian,  his  government  and  any  step  taken  by  the  island’s
politicians Chinese leaders saw as independence-oriented29. The PRC also took care of
waiting for the final results to enact any measures that could be used by the Green
camp to fuel its campaign and boost its electoral chances. However, once the outcome
known,  Peking  did  not  wait  long  to  announce  the  coming  enactment  of  an  Anti-
secession law by China’s rubber-stamp Parliament, and therefore raise tensions again
across the Strait30. On the other hand, Peking responded carefully but rather positively
to Chen’s new offers of cross-Strait contact and Chinese New Year charters between the
two sides. But it waited after the election to speed up the negotiations and agree to the
exchange for the first time of non-stop direct flights to serve Taiwanese businessmen in
China31. In a sense, the PRC’s tactic was successful as it avoided being a major factor in
the  election,  usually  negative  to  the  Pan-Blues.  However,  the  timing  of  the  Anti-
Secession Law announcement, following the Chinese Communist Party’s own schedule
and institutional process, was clearly felt as overly insensitive to the election outcome
and Taiwanese population desire for better cross-Strait relations.
30 As for  the  United States,  relations  between the Bush administration,  especially  the
State Department, and Chen remained tense, marked by a lack of mutual trust, and a
series  of  official  declarations  emphatically  non-supportive  of  Taiwan’s  government,
which as usual had a lot of echoes in the island’s media and political circles32. Although
it did not have a clear impact on the election, it showed to everybody that the DPP
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government needed to amend its relations with Washington and establish a sounder
system  of  consultation  and  co-operation  with  its  main  ally.  Neither  did  the  US
presidential election have a strong influence as Bush was seen as the better choice for
Taiwan by both the government and the opposition. Also no big changes were expected
with the nomination of the new Secretary of State, Condoleeza Rice33. Contrary to last
year’s presidential pre-campaign, the US factor was therefore not significant although
certainly not favouring the DPP. Powell’s remarks in China about Taiwan, obviously
expressing deep frustration about the direction taken by Taiwan and the cross-Strait
situation, were also badly articulated and clearly oblivious of the political consensus in
Taiwan about the country’s status34.  For the KMT and other blue parties,  even pro-
unification  factions,  and  the  DPP  government,  the  Republic  of  China  (ROC)  is  an
independent and sovereign country as much as and on a par with the People’s Republic
of China (PRC), as attested, among others, by official diplomatic relations the ROC still
have  with  26  countries  and  had  until  1979  with  the  United  States35.  Such  remarks
probably had an effect opposite to their intended goal, showing how poor Washington’s
understanding is about the Taiwan situation and Taiwanese people’s own perception of
their country, and in making the government and people more nervous than necessary
about the strength of US commitment to Taiwan, and therefore about the kind of future
they can expect.
31 The need for a better co-operation mechanism is also true for the United States, which
can no longer leave its interaction with Taiwan—and strategic interests in the region—
so little managed now that the cross-Strait tension and military balance, and the de
facto evolution of the terms of the status-quo in China as well as in Taiwan, make war a
much more likely scenario than before36. The US Defense Department’s posting of an
active  duty  military  officer  in  Taipei  for  the  first  time  since  197937,  as  well  as  its
continuing  efforts  in  helping  modernise  the  Taiwanese  forces,  and  its  pressure  on
Taiwan’s political parties to ratify the acquisition of its latest arms package, all show
that Washington is aware of the problem.
32 One topic of US-Taiwan relations was nonetheless a subject of intense debate during
the election campaign: the US$18 billion arms deal offered by Washington and agreed
upon by the Chen government in 2004 after three years of discussion. The government
made  the  approval  of  this  deal  by  the  Parliament  a  central  part  of  its  2004-2005
programme and budget, and after being rebuffed by the opposition as a main issue of
its campaign. Chen and the DPP see the arms deal as essential to cement the informal
military and strategic alliance with the United States as much as to improve relations
between the two sides by showing the commitment of the island to pay for its future
defence against a potential Chinese attack. For that, they prepared a special budget to
finance the cost of the deal over a ten-year period. The KMT and the Pan-Blue, big
supporters of costly arms deal with the United States when in power, criticise now both
the excessive amount and the necessity of some of the weapons to be bought (especially
the submarines that nobody really knows by who and where they are going to be built,
and  which  represent  a  big  part  of  the  arms  procurement  package).  The  issue  has
become such a focus of political struggle, that few can distinguish any more the real
defence or public expenditure concerns expressed by the opposing camps under their
partisan  battle38.  The  arms  deal  still  awaits  ratification  though  Chen  promised  the
Americans to ensure its passage before the end of 2004. Indeed, in spite of meetings
between US administration officials and Soong Chu-yu, and his subsequent declarations
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hinting  towards  a  compromise,  the  blue  camp  continues  to  block  the  deal  in
Parliament.
A closer reading of the poll figures
33 At a first look, the election results can easily be interpreted as a victory for the Pan-
Blue and a reversal of its past (mis)fortunes concomitant to a Pan-Green defeat; and as
an impressive continuity in voter preference over a three-year period. This lecture has
indeed been largely dominant in opposition party circles and media analyses. Following
this  line,  Chen  Shui-bian’s  March  re-election  could  then  be  interpreted  as  an  odd
phenomenon  only  explainable  by  the  “silver  bullets”  conspiracy  theory  and  other
election abnormalities, and the December 11th poll the vindication of Pan-Blue analysis
of an unfair and stolen presidential election. 
34 For  the  DPP,  different  legislative  and  presidential  election  outcomes  are  however
explained by tactical and technical errors in its December poll campaign organisation,
compounded  by  over-confidence  within  the  green  camp  and  vote-fatigue  in  the
electorate. Moreover, the DPP’s progress both in terms of percentage of the vote and
seats would tend to demonstrate that its programme still managed to convince more
voters and therefore that the election loss cannot be attributed to its pro-independence
stance nor express a disaffection of the electorate 
35 Actually,  a  closer  look  at  the  result  shows  that   although  the  Pan-Blue  victory  is
without any doubt a real political success, its electoral basis is rather fragile; and that
there is a clear consolidation of DPP strength in the electorate that could lead to better
outcomes for the greens in the future. Further, voters tended to favour middle-of-the-
road  programmes,  “centrist”  positions,  and  perhaps  did  not  vote  for  lack  of  such
choices in this election.
36 The first indication that the Pan-Blue election result is paradoxically more a setback
than progress compared to 2001 is shown in the percentage of votes received by the
two camps. Whereas overall the blue camp reached 49.74% of the valid votes in the last
legislative  election,  this  time the  opposition  parties  only  got  46.85% of  the  vote,  a
decrease of almost 3% (Table 2). In the meantime, voter support for the green camp
increased by 2.4% to 43.5%. The difference between the two camps therefore narrowed
from 8.6% to 3.3%, a result that cannot in any case be considered a success for the
opposition. 
37 Second point, the turnout factor. At 59.16%, it is the worst turnout of any national-level
election since the beginning of free and competitive polls in the 1990. Turnouts for
legislative elections are generally lower than for presidential elections, so nobody will
be surprised that the December elections did not match the 80.28%, 82.69% and 76.04%
respectively  for  the  2004,  2000  and  1996  direct  presidential  elections.  However
compared  with  the  three  previous  legislative  polls  since  1995,  this  turnout  was
considerably lower. In the 1995 legislative election, turnout was 67.65%, in 1998 it was
68.09%, and in 2001 66.16% (Table 4). Abstention in December 2004 was thus 7% higher
than the time before (and an average 8% higher than in the last decade). Combined
with  a  2.3%  increase  in  the  share  of  the  eligible  voters  compared  to  the  whole
population (itself rising) since 2001, this means that a considerable smaller number of
people actually went to vote. While 735,671 more people were eligible to vote than in
2001, the December 2004 election witnessed 672,706 less people casting their vote39.
Taiwanese political parties hence clearly failed to impress the voters and make them
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vote: if we add the diminution in turnout to the rise in the eligible population, more
than 1.4 million old and new voters decided not to vote this time.
38 But this overall loss was not proportionally transferred to each of the different parties
this  time.  The  parties’  actual  wins  and  losses  in  absolute  numbers  rather  than  in
percentage give us a better image of their power of attraction for the population. The
DPP emerges here as the only party that saw rise in voter numbers: an increase, albeit
small, of 23,689 votes (Table 2). For the KMT, one needs to add to its 2001 tally the NP
votes  since  they  concluded  an  electoral  alliance  this  time  (and  add  NP’s  Kinmen
candidate votes in 2004). In 2001 the total of KMT and NP votes climbed to 3,218,991,
while in December 2004, the sum of their voters only reached 3,202,218, resulting in a
loss of 16,773 votes. For the PFP, the reduction was much more significant: a fall of
567,223 votes, or close to 30% of its 2001 vote. The TSU, while maintaining its vote share
in percentage, did register a loss as well, as it gathered 44,848 less votes than in 2001.
The independent candidates’ number of votes hardly budged (-5,341) although their
percentage of the vote rose 0.5%40.
39 The 2.89% loss of the Pan-Blue in vote percentages translates then in absolute figures
into 584,000 less votes, while the green camp saw its support wane only by 21,159 votes.
In other words, the Pan-Blue vote diminution represents 84% of the overall decrease in
the number of votes cast (or of the 7% increase in abstention), while the green camp
loss constituted only 3.2% of it. On the basis of these numbers, the Pan-Blue legislative
victory cannot be presented as a big success in its extending its influence or attraction
on the Taiwanese electorate neither as giving it a strong new mandate―and needless
to say even less over-riding the Chen Shui-bian mandate received in March with 11.8%
more votes than in 2000 (or almost 1.5 million more votes). Furthermore, it shows that
the gain of 11 seats by the KMT at the expense of the PFP did not correspond in any
gain in vote numbers for the KMT.
40 When compared to other parties’ results, one can hardly say that the DPP campaign
failed as it is the only one to have gained more voters than in the previous election. The
DPP’s  biggest  failure  consists  in  not  having  attracted  more  people  to  the  polling
stations. This is especially true as higher turnouts are generally considered to favour
the green camp. The blue camp’s core electorate is indeed seen to be more reliable and
ready to vote to express its opposition to the current government policies and regain
power. If this were the case, the continuous lowering of Pan-Blue vote numbers and
vote-share would mean that  its  electoral  basis  is  fast  diminishing (584,000 votes  in
three years).
41 The DPP is therefore clearly consolidating its political dominance and electoral basis
both against the blues and the TSU. As we noticed, tactics were a strong factor in the
green camp’s setback. Indeed, many DPP or TSU candidate defeats were by very small
margins of one or a few thousands votes, and often with two candidates of the same
party or one from each party defeated. Although in local districts, candidate affiliations
do not always recoup party affiliation and then cannot ensure a perfect transfer of
votes between candidates. Better co-operation in the candidate nomination process and
in vote-allocation between the DPP and the TSU could have ended very differently on
election day. Add to that a few more percent in turnout, and the green camp might
have wrested victory from the others. From these figures, one can even see that pre-
election polls were not so wrong after all as they were based on a much higher turnout. 
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42 Chen’s  identity  issues-focused  campaign  seemed  to  have  two  opposite  results:  to
consolidate the DPP’s electoral basis and voter fidelity; and to scare away or discourage
non-party affiliated and “centrist” voters to vote for the Green camp. On the basis of
the  election  outcome,  this  could  be  seen  as  a  tactical  error.  But  on  a  longer-term
perspective, it might have strong strategic value in helping to achieve two things. First,
by reaffirming its pro-independence programme and identity, the DPP has managed to
generate a growth of core-support for the party and influence in the population while
eliminating the menace of the TSU over its vote-pool, especially in the south. Voters
who chose the DPP in December would probably not abandon it in future polls unless it
makes huge mistakes in governance or changes its political identity. They either saw
themselves in the DPP rhetoric or at least actively favoured it against both Pan-Blue
and TSU programmes41. 
43 At  the  same  time,  the  disappointing  result  of  the  election  should  slow  down  DPP
radicals as they realise that they are still not the national majority. It can be used by
DPP leaders to steer a more moderate policy with the next elections in view―national
assembly,  city  and  county  chiefs  (2005),  Taipei  and  Kaohsiung  mayoralty  (2006),
presidential and legislative (2008). This would help them win over more centrist voters
by good governance and compromise with the opposition while holding firm on ROC
sovereignty,  independence  and  its  democratic  system,  and  steadily  reinforce  the
population’s Taiwanese “consciousness”. 
44 To conclude, in the elections, DPP support rose more than for any other party, both in
vote percentage and vote numbers. The Pan-Blue voter base weakened considerably
compared to previous elections showing a diminishing influence of the KMT and PFP in
the population as a whole. All parties failed to draw the electorate to the voting-booth,
especially the centrist voters, with stronger negative consequences for the DPP. The
electorate tended to reject radical parties in both camps (PFP and TSU) in favour of
(relatively) moderate ones. The KMT under Lien Chan succeeded in reversing its decline
but  the  number  of  votes  did  not  progress.  Retail  politics,  local  factions  and  local
networks are still important components of success in the legislative elections. Finally,
tactics  (nomination,  vote-allocation)  were  a  major  factor  in  determining  the  final
outcome.
Consequences of the poll and recomposition of Taiwan’s political field
45 The election shows, once again,  that opinion polls should not be trusted too much,
especially  in  Taiwan  where  reliability  is  marred  by  partisanship  and  scientifically
unsound methods. 
46 For the Pan-Blue, new rifts in the alliance and not so clear skies for the KMT are now to
be expected. A party continuously losing voters, even when economic conditions (2001)
or the external political (2004) environment are bad for its opponent, is facing a real
challenge  in  ensuring  any  future  political  dominance.  The  KMT’s  success  in  this
election was mainly built on the return of the “lost children” of the PFP and the NP to
the old party, and on a very efficient mobilisation of its core base of local supporters. It
vindicates the ideological return to a pre-Lee Teng-hui and orthodox KMT engineered
by Lien Chan during the last four years in order to win back the true-blue voters who
deserted  him  for  Soong  and  the  PFP  in  2000  and  200142.  The  KMT  now  faces  the
challenge of internal reforms in a somewhat better position and the old leaders will
have  a  chance  to  leave  with  dignity.  Lien  Chan should  retire  as  KMT chairman in
August and the party will have to find a new leader43. But, if the true-blue voters are
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not going to leave the party or the Alliance, as the poll’s figures indicate, they do not
constitute a sufficient majority to ensure wins in further elections, especially in times
of higher turnouts. The Blue camp’s appeal appears lower than ever as it was unable to
keep more than half-a-million of its own 2001 voters, not to say to attract more centrist
voters. This can be linked to the dissatisfaction of the electorate, especially the young
and middle-class voters, towards the Pan-Blue leaders for their reaction to last March’s
election, their political obstruction in Parliament, their inability to reform and ensure a
generational transfer in their leadership, and finally for their programme, which is not
more attractive than the green’s. That includes the pro-China orientation and calls by
the blue parties for an economic integration with China that scares many in the lower
middle-class who are unable to invest in China and see hardly any benefits for them in
it. 
47 In  terms of  immediate  consequences,  this  election ended any possibility  of  a  quick
merger between the KMT and the PFP, which already decided that it would be better
alone than swallowed by its big ally44.  Beaten by their rival’s electoral machine, the
strong anti-KMT and grass-roots factions of the PFP, represented by the party vice-
president  Chang  Chao-hsiung  and  Soong  himself  are  now  even  less  inclined  to
relinquish the fruits of their work in their last four years and their personal fame and
influence for a marginal position in a newly merged blue party keeping the KMT’s name
and centralised organisation. 
48 In  the opposite  camp,  the defeat  led the DPP’s  leaders  to  thoroughly rethink their
tactics and methods for the coming years. The goals are for Chen to avoid becoming a
lame duck for its entire second-term, and for the party to find a way to implement
some  programmes  and  policies  through  co-operation  with  Parliament.  Party  and
President therefore changed their tone and announced that to respect the popular will
expressed in the election they will seek compromise and co-operation with all parties
including  opening  government  portfolios  to  opposition  politicians  or  forming  a
coalition cabinet45. The idea of collaborating with the blue camp, especially with the
PFP, was then repeatedly affirmed by DPP legislators, government officials and Chen’s
close collaborators46. The result was a “10-point consensus” signed by Chen and Soong
to lower partisan hostilities and foster smoother legislative co-operation.
49 This says a lot about the nature of Taiwan politics, much less ideological and strictly
partisan, and more pragmatic and power-focused than Western analysts would believe
based on the experience of  classic  European party  politics.  But  this  was also  made
possible by two things. First the imperative to deny the “legitimacy” argument branded
by the KMT to take over governmental power in exhibiting a image of consensus for the
DPP and Chen and therefore to show that the President is still the source of executive
power and ultimate political decisions in Taiwan’s constitutional system. Secondly, the
evolution and manoeuvring of the PFP in the wake of its crushing election setback and
end of its merger with the KMT.
50 The PFP’s new strategy focuses on re-centring the party at the middle of the Taiwan
political  spectrum.  While  keeping  on  its  true-blue  mainlander  voter  base,  anti-
independence ideology and objective of political  reconciliation with China, Soong is
rebuilding the image of its party as a bridge and a balance between the two camps to
get the country out of the political deadlock created by the DPP/KMT opposition in the
legislature. The PFP is now officially ready for co-operation with any party in order to
achieve progress in matters of national and people’s interests. DPP’s overtures have
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already legitimised the new image of the PFP. However both parties’ core supporters
reacted rather negatively to the “consensus” and the PFP runs the risk of losing more
true-blue voters to an evermore old-guard looking KMT.
51 An official PFP-DPP coalition, as the latter publicly wished (maybe more by political
calculation than by real intent), would therefore not be possible now. But with the new
and rather open-minded Hsieh Chang-ting government installed, other avenues of co-
operation could be worked out with the PFP or the KMT, dangerously over-passed by its
partner in a “centrist” image.
52 Political  co-operation  in  Taiwan  usually  needs  long  and  repeated  meetings  and
discussions that  do not ensure any eventual  outcome,  and depends always on each
party’s  short-term  strategy.  Whether  the  Taiwan  political  environment  changed
enough after the December election to bring a new type of co-operative spirit between
the government and the legislature will only be attested by 2005 political evolution. In
any case, Soong and Chen showed after the election they still are the most acute and
imaginative  Taiwanese  politicians,  and  in  a  sense  true  representative  of  modern
politics compared to the classic and institutionally-groomed Lien Chan and other KMT
leaders.
53 The political battle’s horizon is now set on a series of minor and local elections in 2005
and 2006,  appetizers  and rehearsals  for  the real  prize  of  the  2008 presidential  and
legislative elections. As the analysis of the December poll figures shows, the blue camp
is not in a very good shape. It would need to devise strong new programmes and
strategies to have a chance to wrestle the presidency from the DPP or even repeat its
legislative success if future turnouts improve. It cannot count only on Ma Ying-jeou’s
charisma and the KMT’s traditional support networks as shown by their continuing loss
of votes in the few last years.
54 In the DPP camp, the necessity of compromise to achieve more in the government will
certainly be an asset in building a more moderate image. The new tandem of Su Tseng-
chang,  who  replaced  Chen  Shui-bian  as  DPP  president,  and  Prime  minister  Hsieh
Chang-ting could then well become the next DPP presidential ticket. For many in the
party, that would constitute a “dream team”. Respectively former Kaohsiung mayor
and Taipei  County chief,  both have won consecutive  electoral  successes  in  a  tough
political environment and are known for their moderation on top of real charisma and
competence.
55 For the TSU, its role as the radical wing of the green camp should persist. Both Lee
Teng-hui and DPP independence advocates considered it important to keep alive and
vocal  their  long-term objective of  formal  disentanglement of  Taiwan from the ROC
constitutional framework. Signs of openness to co-operation with the opposition are
nonetheless  also  appearing,  clearly  with  the  goal  of  presenting a  more  responsible
image for the party. Still, the TSU should remain an appreciated but marginal addition
to the DPP’s chances of further success as the ruling party has proved to be the only
political force making repeated gains in the last series of elections. 
56   Besides this, the political atmosphere and success opportunities in Taiwan will also
much depend on the evolution of cross-Strait relations. Appeasing signs followed the
groundbreaking exchange of direct flights between Taiwan and China for the Lunar
New  Year.  But  tensions  rose  again  with  the  March  8th  enactment  by  the  Chinese
National People’s Congress of its “Anti-secession” law even if most Taiwanese desire
better political and economic relations with the mainland. Once again, US reactions will
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be  crucial  to  manage  the  cross-Strait  situation  and  indicate  where  the  strategic
Washington-Taipei-Peking triangle might be heading. 
57 The  next  Legislative  Yuan  election  in  2008  should  also  present  a  rather  different
picture as it should be held the same day as the Presidential poll, the legislature’s seats
would be cut by half, and a brand new polling system would be implemented based on
single-member  constituencies  and  dual  votes.  Constitutional  amendments  voted  in
August 2004 must however still be ratified by the last convening of National Assembly
this year after its mid-May 2005 election. It will be the first electoral test of the year
and will show how the Taiwanese people react to the political parties’ repositioning. 
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RÉSUMÉS
The recent renewal of Pan-Blue’s parliamentary majorityF0BE in an almost exact repeat of the 2001
election resultsF0BEmasks more changes than it  appears both within the two camps and in the
respective parties’ appeal to the electorate. Winners of the elections, the opposition parties keep
losing voters. On the Green side, the defeat is mainly due to a mix of tactical errors and political
factors. However, the Democratic Progressive Party’s vote share still progresses. The low turnout
also shows a rise in the voter disaffection towards Taiwan’s highly partisan political debate.
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